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The Agency faces many challenges in 
protecting its data and IT infrastructure. The 
Agency is experiencing compromises on a daily 
basis. The threats are real and increasing, and 
now include sophisticated Advanced Persistent 
Threats. 
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Sample Problem Statement:
• Not responding to threats in a timely, consistent 
manner
• Lacking a coordinated operational, technical Agency 
approach to prevention, detection, and remediation
• Not following an organized system for knowledge 
sharing regarding threats and incidents (multiple 
centers are successfully hit by the same attack)
• Not having accurate incident and threat status from 
discovery to resolution
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Sample Problem Statement:
Goal of a SOC
• Improve the Agency’s Incident Detection and Response 
Capabilities
• Manages and Coordinates the Agency’s response to 
Cyber Threats and Incidents
• Monitors the Agency’s Cyber Security posture and 
reports deficiencies
• Coordinates with US-CERT and other Government and 
Non-Government entities
• Performs Threat and Vulnerability Analysis
• Performs Analysis of Cyber Security Events
• Maintains Database of Agency Cyber Security Incidents
• Provide Alerts and Notifications to General and 
Specific Threats
• Provide regular reporting to Management, Agency IT 
Security Officials, and Cyber Incident Responders
Sample SOC Architecture
• Function
• Continuous monitoring of Agency Incident Status & 
Total Life Cycle Incident Management and Tracking 
• Incident Data Sharing, Collaboration, Correlation, 
and Analysis
• Improve Efficiency - Automated workflow, 
notification, and reporting
• Role Based Access Control
• Spot trends and issues
• Root Cause Analysis
• Searchable Database
• Feed Threat Data to TMS8/2/2010 6
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• Function
• Call Center & Data Entry
• 24x7 Monitoring (SIM, IDS, etc.)
• Data Gathering, Correlation and Analysis
• Triage
• Incident Response
• Incident Coordination & Management
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24 X 7 Monitoring Staff
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Threat Management Capability
• Function
• Collect information on threats and methodology from 
Incidents, External Sources (Commercial, public, etc.), 
Partners, CI
• Organize and correlate the information 
• Analyze the relevance of the information to the Agency
• Determine the need and course of action
• Act: Block; Watch; other
• Assess the results
• Utilize Database to Assess new Incidents
• Provide Alerts & Notifications
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Threat Management System
 Unify Threat Management -- Enable Consistent and repeatable threat 
management process. 
 Centralize and Structure Threat Database -- Capture and consolidate 
vulnerabilities, malicious code and patches that affect critical technologies and 
processes. Centralize repository for threat and vulnerability data from trusted 
sources in a searchable, standards-compliant database. 
 Bring in Threat Content -- Populate customized threat data with information from 
Agency’s own research, content from a commercial threat feed provider and 
threat advisories received via email.
 Analyze and Refine Threat Data -- Analyze and react to vulnerabilities and 
malicious code based on the impact to Agency 
 Alert Users to Emerging Threats -- Automatically notify responsible personnel so 
they can proactively address emerging threats. 
 Report on Threat Levels and Activities -- Produce real-time reports and user-
specific dashboards to view threats by technology, severity, type and impact to 
Agency organization.
 Validate Vulnerability Remediation -- Reporting of activities related to threat 
remediation. 
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Threat Management System
Aggregation
Threat
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• SOC Incident Management System (IMS)
• US-CERT/GFIRST
• Other CERTS/FIRST
• Collaborative Intelligence (ShadowServer, Cymru, etc.)
• OSPP
• OIG
• Vendors
• Commercial Alert Service (i.e. IntelliShield, Deepsight)
• Etc.
Security Data Sets
13
SMART Action
SOC
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Cyber 
Threat
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Incident 
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Incident States & Work Elements
SOC Incident Response Process
1. Detection & Reporting
2. Analysis, 
Categorization, & 
Triage
3.Containment
4. Eradication & 
Recovery
5.Post Incident
6.Review/Closeout
States:
Tier-1
EmailCalls
Prioritization Categorization
Event Detail Entry Into IMS
Impact 
Assessment
Sensors System Logs & Events
SIM
Tier-2
Tier-2 Analysis
Resolution 
(Post Incident
Actions)
Closeout
IMS Entry
Initial
Priortization
Initial
Categorization
Call-Down 
Required?
Potential PII 
Incident
Notify US-CERT,
Follow PII Breach 
Response Process 
Yes
No
Yes
No
Incident 
Manager
Incident 
Manager
Review
Tier-2
Containment
Eradication
Recovery
Call Down 
Procedure
Incident 
Manager
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SOC Incident Response Process Flow
OK
Yes
Work Tickets
No
OIG/CI
Incident?
No
Yes
OIG
Counter 
Intelligence
OIG Leads 
Investigation(s)
Counter 
Intelligence Leads
Investigation(s)
Tier-3
Tier-2
Monitoring
Work Tickets
Work Tickets
Cyber Threat Risk Assessment
Threat Opportunity/
Vulnerability
Impact
Credibility Capability Intent
High
(2)
Information from 
highly reliable 
source or has been 
independently 
confirmed 
Actors possess 
Expert level 
knowledge and 
extensive 
resources 
indicative of 
organized efforts
Targeted confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability 
(CIA) attack of dataset 
or individuals.  
Disruption of critical 
Agency mission or 
function.
Systems vulnerable 
to known vectors or 
methodology 
and/or available to 
known Actors.
Significant impact 
to Agency 
Programs, Project, 
Operations, 
People, Data, 
Systems, or Cost.
Moderat 
e
(1)
Information from 
normally reliable 
source but 
unconfirmed
Actors possess 
Moderate to high 
levels of 
sophistication 
with moderate 
resources
Non-targeted Attacks of 
Agency systems 
affecting confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability 
(CIA) of data.  E.g. web 
defacement, botnets, etc. 
Systems potentially 
vulnerable to 
known vectors or 
methodology 
and/or potentially 
available to known 
Actors.
Moderate impact 
to Agency 
Programs, Project, 
Operations, 
People, Data, 
Systems, or Cost.
Low
(0)
Information from 
unreliable source or 
source without 
established history
(or Unknown)
Actors possess 
Low level of 
sophistication 
with little 
resources 
required.
(or Unknown)
“Drive by” or 
opportunistic attacks
(or Unknown)
Systems not likely 
vulnerable to 
known vectors or 
methodology 
and/or not likely 
available to known 
Actors
(or Unknown)
Low impact to 
Agency Programs, 
Project, 
Operations, 
People, Data, 
Systems, or Cost.
(or Unknown)
US-CERT Incident Categories
CAT 0 Exercise/Network Defense Testing This category is used during state, federal, national, international 
exercises and approved activity testing of internal/external network 
defenses or responses. 
CAT 1 Unauthorized Access In this category an individual gains logical or physical access 
without permission to a federal agency network, system, application, 
data, or other resource 
CAT 2 *Denial of Service (DoS) An attack that successfully prevents or impairs the normal authorized 
functionality of networks, systems or applications by exhausting 
resources. This activity includes being the victim or participating in 
the DoS. 
CAT 3 *Malicious Code Successful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, worm, 
Trojan horse, or other code-based malicious entity) that infects an 
operating system or application. Agencies are NOT required to 
report malicious logic that has been successfully quarantined by 
antivirus (AV) software. 
CAT 4 *Improper Usage A person violates acceptable computing use policies. 
CAT 5 Scans/Probes/Attempted Access This category includes any activity that seeks to access or identify a 
federal agency computer, open ports, protocols, service, or any 
combination for later exploit. This activity does not directly result in 
a compromise or denial of service. 
CAT 6 Investigation Unconfirmed incidents that are potentially malicious or anomalous 
activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant further review. 
Incidents Per Year
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2006 2007 2008 2009
Note: Not Real Data!  For illustrative purposes only.
Incidents By Category
1
6%
2
1%
3
43%
4
11%
5
28%
6
11%
1
2
3
4
5
6
Note: Not Real Data!  For illustrative purposes only.
Incidents per Center/Facility
400
15
75
750
100
750
250
350
150
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
A B C D E F G H I
Note: Not Real Data!  For illustrative purposes only.
Tracking Incidents by Categories
• Answers When? What? (Somewhat!) and 
How Often?
• Does not Answer Who? What? 
(Complete), Where? or Why?
• Not conducive to root cause analysis.
• Fails to reveal significant trends.
Practical Questions Unanswered 
1) Were there any insider threats? 
2) Were there any Theft or Espionage by Nation States?
3) Did we have any Spear Phishing incidents? 
4) How many Cat 1 and Cat 3 were because of client side application 
vulnerabilities?
5) How may laptops and PDAs were lost or stolen?  Was PII or SBU or ITAR 
involved in any of those?  How many systems had data encrypted? Do we 
know what data was on the systems?
6) How many incidents were result of user inadvertently going to a 
bad/compromised site?
7) How many systems at the agency were part of a Botnet? 
8) How many instances of web defacement did we have?  How did they get 
in?
9) Did we see any attacks from Social Networks?  If so how many?  Which 
social network?
10) Did we see any attacks on Mobile Devises?
11) How many Scareware incidents were there last year? 
12) How many Cat1 & 3s used OS vulnerabilities? 
13) Which Detection Systems were most effective?
What Do We Need?
• Need a means of categorizing incidents that 
will allow us to answer practical questions 
regarding, WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW, 
and Impact, so that we can begin to 
understand Why it happened:  
• Root-causes? 
• Deficiencies? 
• Motive? 
• Trends.
• To do this, we need a Taxonomy for Incidents. 
Incident Taxonomy
Evolution of Cyber Security
• Reactive
• Proactive
• Predictive
Definitions
• Reactive Cyber Security – Post incident detection, 
analysis, notification, containment, eradication, and 
remediation.
• Proactive Cyber Security – Avoiding or opposing 
threats against computers and networks through 
understanding the situation, assessing potential 
impacts, and implementing deterrence based on 
defensive methodologies.  
• Predictive Cyber Security -- Anticipating and 
predicting future threats and vulnerabilities based on 
strategic analysis, threat intelligence, and correlation 
of disparate datasets to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of  data and IT 
infrastructure. 
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Cyber Security Evolution
Reactive Proactive Predictive
SO
C
Incident Response, Notification, 
Tracking, Analysis, Containment, 
Eradication, and Remediation
Network Vulnerability Scanning: Network, 
systems,
Strategic Analysis
Incident Detection Systems (IDS) Vulnerability Handling Threat Management & Correlation 
System
Computer Forensics & Malware 
Analysis
Third-Party Pen. Testing (3rd Party)
Email Filtering & Blocking
DNS Sinkhole
Threat Tracking, Monitoring, & Mitigation
Patch/Asset Management 
Situational Awareness: Log Monitoring, Event Aggregation and Correlation (SIM)
Flow/Network Behavior Monitoring
Host Based Monitoring System (HBSS): Antivirus, Firewall, Anti-Malware, Application White listing
Active Protection: Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)
Web & Application Scanning
Incident Scope Analysis & Remote Forensics
Content Monitoring/Data Loss Prevention
Red Team/Blue Team
Staffing
Function FTE Hours of Operation
Tier 1 3 (Augmentation to 
Existing Call Center)
24 X 7
Tier 2 12 24 X 7
Tier 3 2 Business Hours
Implementation 6 Business Hours
Infrastructure 3 Business Hours & On 
Call
Total 26
Facilities
• On the Cheap!
• State of Art!
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Cyber Security from Different 
Perspectives
CIO Programs & Projects Law Enforcement
Protect the Enterprise
Incident Response
Proactive Response to Threats
Ensure Availability of IT 
Infrastructure
(Conduct Business)
Ensure Mission Success
(Risks Vs. Rewards)
Catch the Bad Guys!
Access Control (Confidentiality & 
Integrity)
Ensure Availability of Mission 
Critical Systems & Applications
Protect National Security 
Interests
Protect Intellectual Property Gather Information about 
Those who are Gathering 
Information About You
Regulatory Compliance & 
Reporting
Protect Revenue Stream
Different Priorities -> Different Requirements -> Different Solutions
Implementation Challenges
• Budgets – Never enough. Original request 2X 
funded.
• Time – Rush to implement, rush to Operational 
Readiness
• Training 
• Technology -- Complicated
• Change – Change is hard!
• Staffing – Quality Staff is hard to find, hard to 
retain, Don’t Settle!
• 24 X 7 – Difficult to achieve
• Funded Tasks Vs. Expectations of SOC
Other Challenges
• With the Threat of APT, most perimeters are simply 
too porous – A defense-in-depth strategy is needed 
more than ever! If you are just guarding/monitoring 
the perimeter, you will never see it coming – or going.
• Perimeters also don’t help you against insider threats.
• We must balance our resources and efforts – shift 
more away from perimeter only monitoring and 
defenses to more focus on protecting what is 
important within those perimeters. 
• Comprehensive Defense-in-Depth is an order of 
magnitude more expensive than perimeter based 
approach!
• SOC Needs visibility down to the Host Level.
Possible Shopping Lists
• Hosts:
• Firewalls
• IDS/IPS
• Data Loss Prevention
• Behavior Based Detection
• Anti-Spyware
• Rogue Host Detection
• Policy Auditor
• Devise Control (USBs, etc.)
• Asset Management
• Baseline Monitoring (FDCC)
• Application White listing
• Patch Management
• Remote Forensics 
• Etc.
Possible Shopping Lists
• Network
• Log Aggregation and SIM
• Flow Monitoring
• Full Packet Capture
• Next Generation Firewalls – shift from blocking IPs and 
Ports to controlling applications
• Web Application Firewall
• Web Proxy
• Content Monitoring (Network Based DLP)
• New IDSs – Code Behavior/ Reputation 
• Continuous Vulnerability Scanning
• Honeypot
Possible Shopping Lists
• Other
• SOC -- provide Incident Response, Forensics Capabilities, 
Threat Monitoring, Intelligence Gathering 
• Continuous Monitoring
• Better User Training and Awareness – First line of defense: 
Informed Users!
• Contingency Planning
• Red Team/Blue Team (inc. Third Party Penetration Testing & 
Web/Application Testing)
• Encryption 
• 2 Factor Authentication
• Identify, classify, and tag what you need to protect, what are 
your crown jewels, what will affect your organizational 
viability.
• MORE FUNDING & RESOURCES!!!
Recommendations for Building a SOC
• Commitment from the highest level of management
• Don’t underbid, don’t accept less $$$ than is 
necessary for success.
• Focus on quality – Start with Good People!
• Don’t over consolidate – Can’t do everything, still 
need boots on the ground!
• Manage Expectations – Change takes time, SOC does 
not solve all IT Security problems.
• Partner internally and externally.
• Don’t reinvent if you don’t need to -- Get help from 
others who have been through it.
• Share With the community!
Conclusion:
• SOC will help your Agency/Organization deal 
with incidents more efficiently and 
effectively.
• If SOC is funded only to be REACTIVE, your 
incident rates will not significantly decrease! 
• Passive Monitoring and Reactive SOC is a 
starting point…Ultimately, SOC needs to be 
Active, Proactive, and Predictive and be part 
of a Comprehensive Defense-in-Depth 
approach.
